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Abstract: Empirical studies of inequality and poverty are usually based on disposable cash 
incomes, disregarding incomes in-kind (non-cash incomes). Since individuals also derive 
utility from the consumption of goods and services provided in-kind monetary income is not 
always a good indicator of an individual’s utility or “command over resources”. Thus, 
distributional analysis based on cash incomes may be seriously biased. Inclusion of non-cash 
incomes (arising from private sources or from public provision of services such as health, 
housing and education) may allow for better targeting and allocation of resources in fighting 
poverty and social exclusion. The present paper focuses on non-cash incomes arising from 
publicly provided education in seven European countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK), as part of a broader research project (AIM-AP Accurate 
Income Measurement for the Assessment of Policy) investigating the distributional 
implications of including elements of non-cash income in the measurement of wider 
resources. 
 
In all countries under examination public education transfers account for a considerable 
proportion of the total transfers of the state to the citizens. The paper uses static incidence 
analysis under the assumption that public education transfers do not create noticeable 
externalities, combining the information of existing nationwide income surveys with external 
information on spending per student in particular levels of the education system. In all 
countries public education transfers are found to reduce aggregate inequality. These effects 
are driven by the impact of primary and, especially, secondary education transfers at the time 
of their receipt and assuming benefits are valued at cost by recipients. In a static framework, 
transfers in the field of tertiary education appear to have a small distributional impact while the 
size and the sign of this impact depend on the treatment of tertiary education students living 
away from the parental home. 
 
   
Corresponding Author: Tim.Callan@esri.ie  
* The Economic and Social Research Institute and IZA  
** Luxembourg Income Study and Syracuse University  
*** Athens University of Economics and Business, IZA and CERES 
 
 
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by members who are solely responsible 
for the content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers will be welcome and 
should be sent to the author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. 
 2 
Distributional Effects of Public Education Transfers in  
Seven European Countries 
 
1. Introduction  
Cross-national national analyses of welfare state transfers and their effects on 
inequality find large differences amongst OECD nations. They find that most of the 
differences in inequality at the bottom of the income distribution --as measured by 
relative poverty rates--are due to cross national differences in levels of earnings and 
especially in ‘welfare state transfers’ [Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995), 
Hacker, Mettler and Pinderhughes (2005), Kenworthy (2004)]. Scandinavian and 
Nordic countries like Denmark are big spenders in cash terms and reduce inequality 
the most; the English speaking countries, including Ireland and the UK, spend the 
least and reduce inequality the least; and the continental European countries spend a 
lot, but achieve less equality than the Scandinavians. Southern European nations like 
Greece and Spain spend the least and have the highest inequality [Heady, Mitrakos 
and Tsakloglou (2001), Dennis and Guio (2003), Förster and Mira d'Ercole (2004)]. 
These cross national differences support the proposition of some welfare state 
theorists such as Titmus (1958) and Esping-Andersen (1990) that there are distinct 
welfare state regimes, or as Esping-Andersen puts it, “three worlds of welfare 
capitalism.” A major limitation of the research on the effects of the welfare state on 
poverty and other distributional outcomes is that the analyses of transfers and their 
effects on inequality are restricted to cash or near cash transfers only.1 Yet in all of 
these rich countries, about half of welfare state transfers consist of in kind benefits 
such as education, health insurance, child care, elderly care and other services. In kind 
as well as cash transfers reduce inequalities in standards of living as documented in 
research within selected countries but only occasionally cross nationally and never for 
a large set of European Union nations. 
Most importantly, ‘welfare state ‘ theorists, including Esping-Andersen, Titmus and 
others cited above, fail to include education in their analyses of the welfare state. This 
tendency is strengthened by the institutional stances of the OECD and other bodies 
which publish annual series of ‘Social Welfare Expenditures’ that explicitly exclude 
                                                 
1. Most cross national analyses of inequality are based on cash incomes only; see, for example, 
Gustafsson and Johansson (1999), Alderson and Nielsen (2002), Moller et al (2003), Kenworthy 
(2004). 
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education , leaving it to another entirely different annual series. It is as if health and 
cash benefits are the only ways in which the state supports the needs of families for 
basic wants and building of human capabilities. But of course, in the 21st century, 
education is likely the most sought after and most productive method of building 
human capital and strengthening the economic position of nations and their citizens. 
This leads to a high demand for good quality schools, especially for  institutions of 
higher learning. 
The theoretical and empirical importance of valuing in kind benefits has been 
understood for nearly a quarter century [Smeeding (1977, a)]. Conceptually it is clear 
that these benefits are worth some nontrivial amount to beneficiaries. Thus, from a 
theoretical point of view, a measure that counts in kind transfers is superior to the 
conventional measure of cash disposable income as a measure of a household’s 
standard of living [Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000), Atkinson et al (2002), Canberra 
Group (2001)]. The first cross national study of inequality to incorporate health and 
education [Smeeding et al (1993)] found only small changes in cross national 
differences, with the exception of Great Britain. However, these researchers used data 
from the 1980s when health care played a much smaller role than it now does, and 
included only 7 nations in total, with just three from the EU (Germany, Netherlands, 
UK ) and no southern European nations. 
 
 A number of more recent studies using cross-national information and employing a 
variety of techniques to examine the distributional effects of in-kind public transfers 
suggest that public education transfers reduce aggregate inequality. [Whiteford and 
Kennedy (1995), Steckmest (1996), Harding, Lloyd and Warren (2006), Garfinkel, 
Rainwater and Smeeding (2006), Marical et al (2006)] or national surveys [James and 
Benjamin (1987), Lampman (1988), Evandrou et al (1993), McLennan (1996), 
Huguenenq (1998), Tsakloglou and Antoninis (1999), Harris (1999), Antoninis and 
Tsakloglou (2001), Sefton (2002), Lakin (2004)]2 In quantitative terms, cross-country 
differences seem to be substantial, but it is not always clear whether such differences 
are genuine or can be attributed to methodological choices made by the researchers 
                                                 
2 Some studies focus exclusively on education, others examine the impact of several in-kind transfers 
including education 
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(detail of information available, treatment of tertiary education students, treatment of 
taxes, etc.). 
The purpose of this paper is to extend previous analyses of the distributional effects of 
welfare state programs in rich countries by taking into account the effect of education 
transfers of all types on economic inequality in seven EU countries (Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK), in a strictly comparable 
framework. In doing so we examine whether the current image of large differences in 
the equalizing effects of welfare state programs in rich countries is essentially correct 
or whether taking account of in kind benefits in the form of education benefits 
substantially shrinks cross national differences in inequality and alters country 
rankings. Moreover we use a very broad and deep definition of education, including 
elementary/primary, secondary and tertiary education spending by all levels of 
government.  
As far as we know, our study is among the first to focus on tertiary education and its 
distributional consequences . Indeed as the world demand for labor turns increasingly 
to high skill workers, the tertiary education system and tertiary education reform will 
be high in the EU agenda for decades to come ( for instance, see Jacobs and van der 
Ploeg, 2006)  
 
2. Education Systems 
 
The distribution of the benefits from public expenditure on education depend on the 
scale and structure of the educational system. The systems in the seven European 
countries considered here have much in common. Broadly speaking, schooling is 
free3 and compulsory for primary and lower secondary education, and also free of 
tuition fees for second level education. At third level, there is more variation in 
whether or not fees are charged, but there is still a substantial public subsidy in all 
countries, including direct subsidies to students to cover living expenses as well as 
subsides for instruction per se. 
A number of cross-country differences that are likely to influence the results reported 
below have to do with the incidence of private education and the possibility of within-
country differentiation of the size of the transfers to students of particular levels of 
                                                 
3.That is, school is free in the sense that there are no tuition fees; ancillary costs of participation (such 
as books or school uniforms) may fall on parents in some countries. 
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education (for example, due to the existence of federal funding systems).  However, 
the most significant cross-country differences are likely to emanate from differences 
in non-compulsory levels of education.  Where participation in education is 
compulsory, or close to universal even if not compulsory, the distribution of the 
benefit from public expenditure will tend to flow equally to the relevant age cohort.4  
But where participation is neither compulsory nor complete, as in third level 
education (and in some countries, in upper secondary level), then socio-economic 
differences in the pattern of participation can have a significant influence on the 
distributive impact of state expenditure. 
In order to clarify this, Table 1 shows how countries vary in the age at which 
compulsory schooling ends, and the age range over which participation in education is 
more than 90 per cent of the cohort. Three countries have a “school leaving age” (the 
age at which compulsory education ends) of 18, whereas the others have a school 
leaving age close to 15. However, looking at actual participation in education we find 
that with one exception, the number of years for which more than 90% of the cohort 
are enrolled in school is either 12 or 13. The exception is Belgium, where the pre-
school phase has been included in the OECD analysis. Here, however, we focus on 
the benefits deriving from public expenditure on primary, secondary and tertiary 
education.5 
There is much greater variation across the countries in the level and composition of 
third-level enrolment, as seen in Table 2. Third level entry rates vary from about 50 
per cent (Germany and Greece) to rates of 70 to 80 per cent (Belgium and the UK).  
Furthermore the composition of the third level sector, as between university-type 
education and more specialised technical or vocational qualifications is quite 
different. Differences in third level participation may arise from several sources, 
including differences in the structure of the earlier levels of education e.g., whether 
specialisation in more academic type of education tends to take place at an earlier or 
later stage. A further crucial factor is the differences in public spending per student on 
primary, secondary and third level, to which we turn in the next section. 
                                                 
4.Where different forms of schooling are on offer to an age group, with differing costs of provision, 
differences can emerge depending on the pattern of participation across school types. 
5.A separate analysis of the distributional effects of pre-schooling expenditures is planned in the 
framework of the current project for two countries where the existing data allow this exercise; namely, 
Belgium and Germany. 
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The above differences combined with cross-country demographic differences result in 
substantial cross-country diversity in the total (private and public) education related 
expenditures in GDP.  As the evidence of Graph 1 shows, this share varies between 
4.2% in Greece and 5.7% in the UK.  In fact, these figures do not include expenses 
incurred outside educational institutions.  Naturally, the main driving force in all 
countries are public expenditures.  However, substantial cross-country differences can 
be observed regarding the contribution of private expenditures, especially in pre-
tertiary education; in Greece and Germany these expenditures are as high as 0.6% of 
GDP.  Likewise, Graph 2 reports the functional distribution of these expenditures (this 
time including expenditures incurred outside educational institutions).  The largest 
item in all countries consists of core educational expenditures for primary and 
secondary education, followed by the corresponding item expenditures for tertiary 
education.  Nevertheless, the most significant cross-country differences are observed 
in the remaining categories (ancillary services, private payments on instructional 
services/goods outside educational institutions and, particularly, Research and 
Development at tertiary education institutions). Our analysis includes sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the treatment of R&D expenditures). 
 
3.  Data and methods 
The estimates derived in the next section rely on static incidence analysis under the 
assumption that public education transfers do not create externalities.  No dynamic 
effects are considered in the present analysis.  In other words, it is assumed that the 
beneficiaries of the public transfers are exclusively the recipients of the public 
education services (and the members of their households) and that these services do 
not create any benefits or losses to the non-recipients (i.e. the taxes that finance the 
transfers are already there).  Moreover, it is assumed that the value of the transfer to 
the beneficiary is equal to the average cost of producing the public education services 
in the corresponding level of education. Similar assumptions are standard practice in 
the analysis of the distributional impact of publicly provided services [Jones (2006), 
Marical et al. (2006), Smeeding et al (1993)]. 
For the purposes of our analysis information on spending per student in primary, 
secondary and tertiary education derived from OECD’s “Education at a glance 2006” 
is combined with micro-level information from nationwide income surveys.  Each 
student in a public education institution (or a heavily subsidized private education 
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institution) in the nationwide income survey is assigned a public education transfer 
equal to the average cost of producing these services in the corresponding level of 
education.  Then, this benefit is assumed to be shared by all household members.  In 
other words, it is implicitly assumed that in the absence of public transfers the 
students and their families would have to undertake the expenditures themselves. 
The national databases used in the analysis and the corresponding reference years are 
shown in Table 3.  It should be noted that the detail of educational information of the 
population members varies considerably across countries.  However, since the aim of 
the present paper is to provide a comparative analysis, a “least common denominator” 
approach was adopted; that is, the educational classification used was restricted to 
ensure compatibility across countries.  As a result, we focus exclusively on three 
levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary), thus leaving aside other levels 
such as pre-primary and non-tertiary post-secondary education and suppressing the 
distinction between general and technical secondary education as well Type-A and 
Type-B tertiary education and the distinction between undergraduate and postgraduate 
studies in tertiary education.6 
Estimates of public spending per student in primary, secondary and tertiary public 
education institutions were derived as follows.  Figures from Table X2.5 (p. 434) of 
OECD’s “Education at a glance 2006” (Annual expenditure on educational 
institutions per student for all services (2003) in equivalent euros converted using 
PPP, by level of education based on full-time equivalents) were multiplied by the 
estimates of the share of public expenditures in total educational expenditures 
(separately for tertiary and non-tertiary education) reported in Table B2.1b (p. 206) 
(Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP by level of education 
(1995, 2000, 2003) from public and private sources by source of funds and year) and 
euro PPP conversion rates as reported in Table X2.2 (p. 431)  (Basic reference 
statistics (reference period: calendar year 2003, 2003 current prices).  Then, in order 
to derive the corresponding estimates for years other than 2003, these estimates were 
inflated or deflated using country specific nominal GDP per capita conversion factors 
derived from the data of the on-line OECD database (using real GDP growth rates, 
                                                 
6.The interested reader is encouraged to look at the national reports sited in the reference list of the 
paper in order to check for differences between the estimates of this paper and the estimates of these 
reports that are derived using finer educational classifications.  In almost all cases the differences 
between the two sets of estimates are relatively small. 
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GDP deflators and population growth rates).  The estimates in current national prices 
are shown in Table 4.7 
In all countries public spending per secondary education student is higher than the 
corresponding figure for primary education students.  However, in some countries 
such as Germany, Ireland and Belgium the differences are quite large, while in others, 
such as Italy and Greece, the differences appear to be relatively small.  Comparisons 
of spending per student in secondary and tertiary education depend on the treatment of 
public R&D expenditures. It is very likely that activities financed by such 
expenditures have positive spillover effects to the students; however, their main 
beneficiaries are not the students. For this reason, in the following analysis we present 
estimates derived from public transfers to tertiary education students net of R&D 
public expenditures.  As a check of the robustness of our findings, Appendix I reports 
results derived from estimates of public transfers to tertiary education students that 
include R&D spending. When spending per student in tertiary education institutions is 
net of R&D expenditures, this spending is generally similar to the level of spending 
on secondary education students (with the exception of Italy, where third level 
spending excluding R&D is below expenditure per student in second level 
education).8  
Apart from the treatment of R&D expenditures, in the case of tertiary education 
students living away from their parental homes there is the broader question of 
whether the equivalised household income per capita is a good approximation of their 
standard of living.  Typically, in most empirical studies, such students who do not live 
in collective households are treated as independent units.  However, in our case this 
treatment may lead to misleading results regarding the distributional effects of public 
education subsidies to tertiary education students since in most countries the majority 
of the students who live with their parents appear to be in the top half of the income 
                                                 
7.Due to lack of detailed information, we take no account of within country inequality in expenditures 
for children’s education. In the case of the US, Duncombe and Yinger (1997), Card and Payne (1998), 
Wilson (2000), and Wilson, Lambright and Smeeding (2006) find that public school spending may 
differ by up to 50 percent between rich and poor districts. The sensitivity of our results points to the 
need to undertake research on differences in expenditures on education within countries by income 
class because public expenditures on schooling may also differ by income class in other countries 
besides the United States and we have no evidence of by how much.  
8.It should be noted that these figures are influenced by the particular way used by the OECD in order 
to calculate the average number of years of studies and, consequently, the number of full-time 
equivalent students in each country.  
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distribution while the majority of those who live alone are disproportionately located 
close to the bottom of the distribution, even when stipends for living expenses are 
taken into account.  
 Analyses which simply looks at all students , risk attributing an unwarranted benefit 
to low income groups, simply because students moving away from high income 
homes, have temporarily low incomes during their student years; while the literature 
on the returns to education indicates that their likely positions in the earnings 
distribution will be towards the top. Moreover, the living arrangements of tertiary 
education students differ substantially across countries, while their treatment in the 
national surveys in not always the same.  For example, most of tertiary education 
students in Greece live with their parents whereas this is the case of relatively few 
such students in the Netherlands, whereas in Belgium and Italy, students living in 
collective households (such as student accommodation) are treated as members of 
their parental households.  Moreover, as ‘students’ move into their late 20’s, it may 
well be that they are financially independent of their parents, in which case the student 
alone or with partner may be a more the appropriate unit. While tertiary school 
enrollments have increased substantially over the past two decades, tertiary students 
are taking increasingly long period  to complete  their studies (Fitzpatrick and  Turner, 
2007). Thus the issue of the economic independence of tertiary students will continue 
to grow in coming decades ( see also Bell, Burtless, Gornick and Smeeding, 2007) .    
  
As a result, the distributional effects of public transfers to tertiary education students 
are not always strictly comparable across countries and the next section reports results 
both for all tertiary education students (including those living away from their parents, 
when the student’s income position will be determined purely by his or her own 
student income) and for tertiary education students living with their parents, with the 
income of the parental household being taken into account when measuring the 
distributional impact of public education subsidies 
Radner (1997) points out that in standard analysis of the distribution of cash income, 
equivalence scales are used to adjust for the differing needs of households of different 
size and composition. When health or education services are included in the measure 
of resources, he argues that differing needs for health and education services should 
also be taken into account. Just as the welfare of an elderly person can be overstated 
by including the insurance value of publicly provided health cover (Smeeding, 1982b) 
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the welfare of a family with children can be overstated by including the value of non-
cash education benefits, without taking account of the educational needs of the 
children.  
 
We consider two variations on the standard approach to take account of these points. 
In Appendix 1, we look separately at the impact of compulsory education and non-
compulsory education. It is for compulsory education that arguments concerning the 
existence of educational needs, precisely corresponding to the publicly-provided 
services, are strongest. The analysis of the distribution of benefit from non-
compulsory education can be regarded as an alternative focus, less susceptible to the 
arguments concerning corresponding educational need. We have also undertaken 
some sensitivity analysis which focuses on groups with identical educational needs – 
specifically, those with exactly one child of an age to participate in primary, 
secondary or third level education. While at present this analysis is confined to one 
country, the results are suggestive. 
 
A final methodological point relates to the fact that when dealing with taxes and cash 
transfers it is standard practice to regard as progressive a policy or set of policies 
which yield higher proportionate gains for lower income groups, and proportionate 
gains declining with income. In the present framework, non-cash benefits are “cashed 
out” and aggregated with cash income, and the same criteria for progressivity apply – 
higher proportionate gains for the lower income groups, raising their share of total 
income or resources. By this criterion, an education policy can be progressive even if 
it gives much greater absolute value to higher income groups (in line with the greater 
income share of high income groups). An alternative and perhaps more widely 
accepted benchmark for a neutral education policy would be that it gave the same 
absolute value to all. Nevertheless, in the context of an analysis of income or resource 
distribution, it is necessary to use the standard applied in the case of cash incomes. 
Expectations of what might constitute an appropriate impact on relative inequality 
may, however, be informed by the “equal value to all” benchmark. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
This section presents the main empirical findings of the paper.  We start by reporting 
the position of the beneficiaries of public education subsidies in the income 
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distribution when the population is grouped in quintiles according to their equivalised 
disposable income.  Then, we proceed to the examination of the size of these transfers 
per quintile and their proportional impact vis-à-vis the disposable income of each 
quintile. Finally, we analyse their impact on aggregate inequality.  The distributions 
used are distributions of equivalised household disposable income per capita and they 
are derived using the “modified OECD equivalence scales” (Hagenaars et al, 1995) 
that assign weights of 1.00 to the household head, 0.50 to each of the remaining adults 
in the household and 0.30 to each child (person aged below 14) in the household.  
Since there are, literally, thousands of figures that are reported below, the results are 
mainly presented in graphs.  The figures behind the graphs are available from the 
authors on request.[see covering email] 
Graph 3 presents the position of the beneficiaries of public education subsidies in the 
distribution of equivalised household disposable income per capita for primary, 
secondary and tertiary education. Bars higher (lower) than 20% indicate that the 
quintiles under consideration contain proportionally more (less) beneficiaries than 
their population shares. The top left graph depicts the situation regarding primary 
education.  In Belgium, the beneficiaries of public primary education transfers appear 
to be fairly evenly distributed across quintiles, while in the rest of the countries they 
seem to be disproportionately concentrated in the three bottom quintiles and  
substantially underrepresented in the top quintile.  A similar picture emerges in the 
top right graph which shows that in all countries there is a negative relationship 
between the share of beneficiaries and the location of the quintile in the income 
distribution.  This pattern may be attributed to the combined effect of two factors.  
The first is demographics; households with children are less likely to have reached the 
top of their earnings capacity and/or have a lower share of earners and, hence, are 
more likely to be concentrated in the lower quintiles.  The second has to do with 
private education.  Although in all of the countries under consideration the 
overwhelming majority of the students attend public schools, private education 
appears to be a (very) high income elasticity commodity and the students who attend 
private schools can be found almost exclusively in the top two quintiles of the 
distribution (especially the top). 
The two graphs at the bottom examine the location of public tertiary education 
beneficiaries in the income distribution.  The graph on the left shows the location of 
all such beneficiaries, while the graph on the right focuses exclusively on those who 
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live with their parents.  For the reasons described in the previous section, it is the 
latter group that provides a better picture of the short-rum distributional effects of 
public transfers in tertiary education.  For two countries – Belgium and Italy – the two 
sets of estimates are identical since in these countries the great majority of tertiary 
education students living away from their parents were classified as members of the 
parental household.9  Further, it should be stressed again that the share of tertiary 
education students living with their parents differs substantially across countries and 
this is likely to have a strong influence on cross-country comparisons.  No clear cross-
country pattern emerges from the bottom left graph.  In some countries, the 
beneficiaries of public tertiary education are more likely to be found around the 
middle of the income distribution whereas in the Netherlands they are strongly 
overrepresented in the bottom quintile and in the UK there is a clear positive 
association between the share of the beneficiaries and the quintile of the income 
distribution to which they belong to.  However, in the graph at the bottom right, where 
the focus is exclusively on the sub-group of tertiary education students who live with 
their parents, the picture that emerges in all countries apart from the Netherlands is 
broadly similar: the higher the quintile, the higher the share of beneficiaries.  In 
Netherlands, most of the (relatively small group) of beneficiaries are located in the 
second and the third quintile. 
Graph 4 is similar to Graph 3 but instead of disaggregating by education level, it 
shows the position of the beneficiaries of all levels of public education in the income 
distribution.  Once again, results are provided for all population members and all 
population members apart from students living away from their parents.  The results 
are quite similar in both cases, although slightly less pronounced in the latter.  In all 
countries, the beneficiaries are underrepresented in the top and, in most cases, the 
fourth quintile, while they are overrepresented in the three lowest quintiles. 
However interesting, the results of Graphs 3 and 4 provide only partial indirect 
evidence on the progressively redistributive role of public education subsidies, since 
they may be driven primarily by demographics.  Graphs 5 and 6 attempt to isolate this 
factor.  More specifically, Graph 5 reports the relative ratio of actual beneficiaries to 
potential beneficiaries per quintile for each of the three levels of education.  For the 
                                                 
9.For this reason, in all the graphs and tables where a distinction is made between tertiary education 
students as a whole and tertiary education students living away from their parents, the estimates for 
Belgium and Italy do not change. 
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construction of this indicator, first the number of the quintile’s children who benefit 
from public education transfers in a particular level is divided by the total number of 
children in the corresponding age bracket.  The age brackets are country specific and 
correspond to the typical age brackets that population members attend primary, 
secondary and tertiary education.  In the next stage, the resulting ratio of each quintile 
and educational level is divided by the corresponding national ratio.  As a result, 
figures above (below) one imply that the children of the corresponding quintile are 
overrepresented (underrepresented) among the beneficiaries of public education 
transfers. 
The top left graph depicts the situation regarding primary education. In three countries 
– Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands - the ratio for all quintiles fluctuates very close 
to one.  In Greece and the UK the ratio is lower than one in the top two quintiles and 
higher than one in the three bottom quintiles.  Most probably, these results are driven 
primarily by the differential incidence of private education across quintiles.  The top 
right graph reports the values of the indices for secondary education.  In most cases, 
he pattern is similar to that of primary education.  In the case of secondary education, 
though, apart from private education the results may also be driven by differential 
dropout rates across quintiles.  The most interesting results, though, are reported in the 
lower panel of Graph 5.  When all tertiary education beneficiaries are lumped 
together, in most countries differences across quintiles are not dramatic, although in 
most cases the ratio is below one in the lower quintiles and higher than one in the top 
quintiles.  The exceptions are the Netherlands where the ratio declines monotonically 
as we move up the income distribution and Germany where the reverse sequence is 
observed.  However, when we focus exclusively on tertiary education beneficiaries 
living with their parents, the evidence in most countries shows that the ratio of actual 
to potential beneficiaries is substantially higher at the top than close to the bottom of 
the income distribution. This pattern is particularly pronounced in Germany, Greece, 
Ireland and, to a slightly lesser extent, the UK. The only country where the evidence 
points to the opposite direction is the Netherlands. 
In the next stage, we examine the differential magnitude of the public education 
transfers per quintile.  Graph 6 depicts estimates of the size of the relative mean 
transfer per capita for each quintile for every level of education.  For its construction 
we first calculated the sum of public education subsidies separately for each 
educational level to all beneficiaries in a particular quintile of the distribution of 
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disposable income.  Then, we divided this figure by the number of individuals in the 
quintile (all quintile members; not only the direct beneficiaries, i.e. the students or 
their household members).  Finally, we divided this figure by the corresponding figure 
for the entire population.  Thus, figures higher (lower) than one denote that the 
corresponding public transfer per head to the members of the quintile are higher than 
the national average.  In the cases of primary and, especially, secondary education, 
public transfers to the average member of the three bottom quintiles are higher than 
those received by the average member of the two top quintiles in all countries under 
examination (with the exception of Belgium in the case of primary education).  In the 
case of tertiary education the evidence is not that clear when all students are put 
together, whereas when the group of students living with their parents is isolated the 
evidence shows that in most countries the benefits per capita are higher in the top than 
in the bottom quintiles.  Graph 7 is similar to Graph 6 but instead of taking public 
transfers per education level separately it lumps them all together (once for the entire 
population and once excluding tertiary education students living away from the 
parental home).  Unsurprisingly, taking into account the evidence of Graph 6, in 
almost all countries and irrespective of including or excluding tertiary education 
students living away from their parents, members of households located in the bottom 
half of the distribution appear to benefit more in absolute terms than members of 
households belonging to the two top quintiles (particularly the top). 
The results so far clearly imply that public education subsidies benefit the poorest 
segments of the population by more than they benefit middle and upper income 
families.  Graph 8 confirms this finding by reporting the value of the public transfers 
as a share of the aggregate quintile disposable income separately for each level of 
education and taking all of them together. A warning is needed before we proceed to 
the discussion of the results of Graph 8.  Since the denominator in these calculations 
is, effectively, the income share of the corresponding quintile, ceteris paribus, 
transfers of equal size will translate into larger proportional increases in the cases of 
quintiles with smaller shares in aggregate disposable income. The size of the 
distributional impact of the education system depends, therefore, not just on the size 
and structure of the education system, but also on the pre-existing distribution of 
disposable income. Similar education systems in two countries would have a greater 
impact in the more unequal country..  Hence, cross-country comparisons should be 
interpreted with caution.  In all countries, the largest increases can be attributed to 
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secondary public education transfers and the smallest to transfers to tertiary education 
students.  The differences between primary and secondary education are partly due to 
the fact that annual transfers per secondary education student are higher than the 
corresponding transfers per primary education student and partly to the fact that in 
some countries secondary education lasts longer than primary education (demographic 
factors and differential incidence of private education across educational levels play 
an important but secondary role, too).  The relatively low impact of tertiary education 
transfers should be attributed to the fact that, despite the high value of the annual 
transfer per tertiary education student, unlike the other two educational levels, 
participation in this educational level is far very from universal and further, tertiary 
education studies are usually shorter than those in either primary or secondary 
education. 
The estimates of the top left graph show that primary education transfers to members 
of the bottom quintile in Ireland are as high as 14.6% of the quintile’s disposable 
income.  The corresponding increase in the rest of the countries varies between 3.1% 
in Germany and 9.7% in Italy.  The proportional impact of these transfers declines as 
we move up in the income distribution and in the case of the top quintile they account 
for increases between 0.5% (Germany and Italy) and 2.1% (Belgium).  Public 
education transfers to secondary education students belonging to the bottom quintile 
are higher than 15% of the disposable income of this quintile in Ireland, Italy, 
Belgium and Germany, but less than 10% in Greece and the Netherlands.  Once again, 
the proportional impact of these transfers declines as we move up in the income 
distribution and in the case of the top quintile they account for increases between 
0.9% (Netherlands) and 2.5% (Belgium).  As noted above, the proportional impact of 
transfers to tertiary education students is not as large as those to primary and 
secondary education students, but they also seem to cause larger proportional 
increases in the incomes of the poorer rather than the richer households (especially in 
the cases of the Netherlands and Germany).10  Finally, when transfers to all 
educational levels are added together, their value in the case of the bottom quintile 
varies between 18.4% in Greece and 33.7% in Ireland, declining gradually as we 
                                                 
10. Due to space limitations, increases in quintile disposable income as a result of transfers to tertiary 
education students living with their parents only are not reported in Graph 6 but are available from the 
authors on request.  They are less progressive than the results reported in the bottom left graph, but due 
to their relatively small size they do not affect substantially the overall increases in the quintile 
disposable income reported in the bottom right graph. 
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move to higher quintiles and reaching levels between 2.2% (Greece) and 5.8% 
(Belgium).  Naturally, such large and differentiated proportional increases are likely 
to produce significant distributional effects. 
A first glimpse at the distributional effects of public education transfers is provided in 
Graph 9.  This graph compares the changes in the shares of the quintiles as we move 
from the distribution of disposable income to a distribution of a broader concept of 
resources that includes disposable income as well as the value of public education 
transfers.11  Qualitatively, the results are very similar in all countries.  The three 
bottom quintiles increase their share at the expense of the two top quintiles (especially 
the top).  Quantitatively, there are some differences.  In Ireland, the Netherlands and 
the UK it is share of the second quintile that increases the most, while in the rest of 
the countries the largest increases are observed in the share of the bottom quintile.  In 
Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands the share of the top quintile declines by more than 
two percentage points as we move to the new distribution, while the corresponding 
decline in Germany is less than 1.5%, with intermediate values for the remaining 
countries . 
Graph 10 shows the impact of public education transfers per level of education on 
aggregate inequality; that is, it reports the proportional change in a number of 
inequality indices when we move from the distribution of disposable income to the 
distribution of disposable income augmented by the public transfers of the 
corresponding educational level.  As inequality indices we chose the widely used Gini 
index and two members of the parametric family of Atkinson (1970) indices.  The 
value of the inequality aversion parameter in the latter is set at (e=0.5 and e=1.5).  
Both indices satisfy the desirable properties for an inequality index (anonymity, mean 
independence, population independence, transfer sensitivity).  Higher values of e 
make the Atkinson index relatively more sensitive to changes closer to the bottom of 
the distribution while, in practice, the Gini index is relatively more sensitive to 
changes around the median of the distribution (Cowell, 2000; Lambert, 2001).  
The evidence of Graph 10 illustrates very clearly that public education transfers 
reduce aggregate inequality quite substantially.  In all cases the recorded effects are 
                                                 
11.For the derivation of the second distribution, the public education transfers received by all household 
members were added to the disposable income of all household members and the sum was divided by 
the household’s equivalence scale.  The resulting figure was attributed to all household members.  
Naturally, the composition of the quintiles changes when we move from the distribution of disposable 
income to the new distribution due to re-rankings. 
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larger when the Atkinson index is used, irrespective of the value of the inequality 
aversion parameter.  In all countries and irrespective of the index used the strongest 
redistributive effects appear to stem from secondary education transfers, followed 
closely by primary education transfers.  Transfers to tertiary education students 
produce only modest reductions in inequality – with the possible exception of the 
Netherlands – and in most cases they almost disappear when the sample is restricted 
to tertiary education students living away from the parental home (in Germany they 
produce a marginal rise in inequality). 
We undertook a sensitivity analysis for Ireland designed to examine the impact on 
inequality within groups having the same educational needs, as discussed in Section 3. 
The groups examined were households with exactly one child of an age to participate 
in first, second or third-level education. The results indicated a reduction in the Gini 
coefficient for the relevant group of about 7% for first and second-level, and about 2% 
for third-level education. These are in line with the findings of our main analysis. 
The evidence of Graph 11 shows that the aggregate distributional effect of all public 
education transfers taken together is very substantial in all countries under 
examination.  As a consequence of these transfers, inequality declines according to 
Gini between 6.6% (Greece) and 11.1% (the Netherlands).  The corresponding 
declines recorded by the Atkinson index are between 10.7% and 20.5% (for the same 
countries).  When tertiary education students living away from their parents are left 
out of the sample, the picture changes a little and the recorded declines in inequality 
appear to be more modest (between 5% and 10% according to Gini and between 10% 
and 19% when either of the Atkinson indices is utilized. 
Does the change in the concept of resources affect the relative ranking of the countries 
under examination regarding their level of aggregate inequality?  An answer to this 
question is provided in Table 5 and it is largely negative.  No re-ranking takes place 
when the Atkinson index is used, while some re-rankings are observed when the Gini 
index is used as an indicator of inequality (Ireland/Germany and Italy/UK).12  What is 
                                                 
12.The results reported in Table 5 are comparable with the estimates of the Gini index before and after 
education transfers reported in Table A.4 of Marical et al (2006), that have been derived using micro-
data from different sources and reference years than those of the present paper (and, further, their 
imputation method is a little different than the one used here).  Like the results of the present paper, 
their results show large declines in inequality and country re-rankings after the impact of the public 
benefit is accounted for, but they report substantially lower baseline inequality estimates for Germany 
and Italy and higher Belgium, while the impact of the public education transfers on aggregate 
inequality according to their estimates is considerably higher than that reported in Table 5. 
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interesting to note, though, is that the ranking of the countries changes when we 
change the index of inequality – a clear indication of intersecting Lorenz curves.  
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the effects of including in-kind public education 
transfers on estimates of cross national differences in inequality and poverty.  Most of 
the existing comparative studies of inequality and its determinants have either ignored 
in-kind transfers or have only dealt with limited amounts of public education 
transfers. Theoretically, full income, which counts in kind transfers is a superior 
measure of a household’s command over resources than is the conventional measure 
of cash disposable income.  And the inclusion of education transfers is one step in this 
direction. 
We estimated only the private market benefits from education at government cost. 
The spillover benefits of education, which may be as large or larger than the direct 
effects, are not counted [Dee (2005), Haveman and Wolfe (2003)]. Positive 
externalities arising from research and development benefits from education 
enterprise are also not counted. In both cases, external and “R&D” benefits accrue to 
the entire populations and therefore might be considered distributionally neutral. The 
private benefits of education accrue mainly to the individuals and their families and 
her we look only at the value of inputs, capital and operating expenses per pupil, not 
at their future value to the individual who receives them.  
We find that valuing in kind education benefits at government cost increases 
disproportionally the real income of low income households and narrows substantially 
differences in inequality within and across countries.  At the bottom of the income 
distribution, when all subsidies for education are added disposable incomes increase 
up to 33 percent in Ireland, almost 30 percent in Belgium and at least by 15 percent in 
Italy. The Gini coefficients decrease by 5 to 11 percent. The bottom three quintiles all 
gain income shares relative to the top two quintiles.  The largest effects are from 
secondary education transfers, though primary education also has a relatively large 
effect. The effects of tertiary education are large per pupil, but accrue only to a 
minority of children. Further, they are most difficult to value and distribute because 
students counted as independent units have low incomes, while the parental 
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households from which tertiary students come are relatively rich. The results of 
sensitivity analysis for tertiary education only, suggest that attributing the 
corresponding public transfers to students living with their parents only rather than all 
students, alters the results concerning the distribution of third-level expenditures 
significantly, but alters aggregate results only marginally.   
Moreover, there are a number of limitations to our analysis. First, due to data 
limitations, we assumed equal distribution of education expenditures per education 
level across all children, irrespective of their household’s income level something that 
existing evidence from other countries seems to refute. Second, there are good reasons 
for believing that the value of education benefits in kind to recipients might be either 
higher or lower than government cost to produce these services. Future research 
should explore alternative valuation methods of in kind benefits as well as examine in 
a more detailed manner the distribution of education benefits within countries.  Last 
but not least, the distributional effects of in kind benefits of public education should 
be analysed in combination with other in kind incomes from both public and private 
sources. 
Assuming that the findings hold up, what are the policy implications? We argue that 
our findings both raise several provocative, policy related questions about the mix of 
cash and in kind benefits which are highly relevant to current policy issues. Direct 
education benefits accrue wholly to families with children, whereas most health 
benefits and social retirement accrue mainly to the elderly. We know that 
demographic change already has and will continue to put great pressure on 
expenditures for the elderly, possibly at the expense of benefits accruing mainly to 
children, such as education [Kane and Orszag (2003)]. This raises the question of 
what kind of mixture best promotes overall well-being—something on which there is 
little research evidence at present. 
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Appendix 1.  Distributive Impacts of Compulsory and Non-Compulsory Schooling 
 
How much of the reduction in inequality is due to compulsory education, and how 
much to non-compulsory? This issue is of particular interest for a number of reasons. 
First, the fact that all children of a given age benefit from compulsory education 
makes it quite different from higher levels of education, where rates of participation 
are lower, and the extent of participation may be structured by social background. 
Second, the fact that education is made compulsory is a very clear indication that it is 
seen as an essential need for children of that age. Like most other analyses of income 
distribution issues, our approach has relied on a standard equivalence scale (the 
modified OECD scale) to take account of differences in need between households of 
different sizes and age compositions. But such scales have been constructed, and 
results interpreted, in the knowledge that the need for compulsory education has 
already been met by its provision as a free service. It could be argued, therefore, that 
in looking for a wider measure of resources standardised for household needs, it 
would be appropriate to exclude the value of free compulsory education on the 
grounds that the extra resources provided to such families are counterbalanced by an 
equal need. On this basis, our focus would shift to the distribution of resources from 
non-compulsory education. 
Table A1 addresses these issues, by identifying the proportionate reduction in the Gini 
coefficient due to compulsory and non-compulsory education. For all countries except 
Germany, the reduction in inequality due to the value of free compulsory education is 
at least two-thirds of the total reduction; for Belgium, Ireland and the UK the 
compulsory component amounts to more than 80 per cent of the total reduction in 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Focusing on the impact of non-
compulsory education, we see that the impact varies from a reduction in the Gini 
coefficient of just over half of one per cent in Greece, to a maximum of 3.7 per cent in 
the Netherlands. These values contrast with total reduction in the Gini coefficient, 
when compulsory education is included, of between 5 and 11 per cent. 
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Table A1. Impact on inequality of compulsory and non-compulsory education 
 
Country 
% reduction in Gini coefficient due to: 
All Compulsory Non-compulsory 
Belgium -7.1 -5.7 -1.6 
Germany -6.7 -3.7 -3.1 
Greece -6.6 -4.6 -0.6 
Ireland -9.6 -7.9 -2.0 
Italy -8.9 -6.0 -3.1 
Netherlands -10.7 -7.1 -3.7 
UK -8.0 -6.4 -1.7 
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Appendix 2:  Estimates of the impact on inequality of educational expenditures excluding  
and including R & D components of third-level spending 
 
For all of the countries examined here, a significant element of the public subsidy to 
the third-level education sector is directed towards expenditure on R&D, rather than 
directly at teaching services for students. OECD figures indicate that at least a quarter 
of the total expenditures, and in some countries as much as 40 per cent, are 
attributable to R&D activities. In the body of the paper, the analysis excludes these 
resources on the basis that they are not primarily directed at benefiting third level 
students. However, at least some of these expenditures do benefit students – for 
example, improving the quality of teaching (by facilitating the research activities of 
university lecturers); or by facilitating the access of students, particularly at 
postgraduate level, to research infrastructures. As identification of the correct 
proportion of this expenditure to attribute to students is not possible, in this appendix 
we compare results based on the inclusion of all R&D expenditures with the base case 
which includes none. 
We focus here on the analysis for all students; very similar results are obtained when 
students living away from the parental home are excluded. Table A2 shows the impact 
of including R&D expenditures on the inequality reduction brought about by third 
level educational expenditures. For most countries, the results including R&D 
expenditures are rather similar to those in the base case, when R&D is excluded. In 
Belgium, the results indicate that with the inclusion of R&D expenditures, the impact 
of educational expenditures is somewhat less equalising; this arises from re-ranking. 
In Italy, by contrast, the inclusion of R&D expenditures leads to a more equalising 
impact. 
Table A3 shows the impact of including R&D expenditures on the inequality 
reduction brought about by all educational expenditures. Here, for all countries, the 
results are very similar whether R&D expenditures are included or excluded. While 
this issue may be of considerable importance for other issues, it makes little difference 
to the impact of educational expenditures on the distribution of resources. 
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Table A2. Impact on resource inequality of exclusion/inclusion  
of third-level R&D expenditures 
 
Country 
Index of inequality 
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1.5) 
R&D excluded    
Belgium -0.6 -1.4 -0.7 
Germany -0.6 -1.3 -1.3 
Greece -0.5 -0.9 -0.7 
Ireland -0.7 -1.1 -0.4 
Italy -0.9 -1.9 -2.0 
Netherlands -1.3 -3.1 -4.1 
UK -0.8 -1.7 -2.7 
R&D included    
Belgium -0.3 -0.9 -0.1 
Germany -0.6 -1.4 -1.1 
Greece -1.2 -2.3 -2.2 
Ireland -0.7 -1.2 -0.4 
Italy -0.8 -1.6 -1.7 
Netherlands -1.3 -3.1 -4.1 
UK -0.8 -1.8 -2.7 
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Table A3. Impact on resource inequality of exclusion/inclusion  
of third-level R&D expenditures 
 
Country 
Index of inequality 
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1.5) 
R&D excluded    
Belgium -7.1 -14.1 -13.0 
Germany -6.7 -12.3 -12.4 
Greece -6.6 -12.3 -11.4 
Ireland -9.6 -16.8 -11.6 
Italy -8.9 -16.7 -18.0 
Netherlands -11.1 -20.5 -20.4 
UK -8.0 -14.0 -12.9 
R&D included    
Belgium -6.8 -13.7 -12.5 
Germany -6.7 -12.4 -12.3 
Greece -6.7 -12.4 -11.5 
Ireland -9.6 -16.9 -11.5 
Italy -9.2 -17.6 -18.4 
Netherlands -11.1 -20.5 -20.4 
UK -8.0 -14.1 -12.8 
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Table 1.  School-leaving age and participation in education, 2004 
Country Ending age of compulsory education 
No. of years for which over 
90% of population are 
enrolled 
Age range at which over 
90% of population are 
enrolled 
Belgium 18 16 3 to 18 
Germany 18 12 6 to 17 
Greece 14.5 12 6 to 19 
Ireland 15 12 5 to 16 
Italy 15 13 3 to 15 
Netherlands 18 12 5 to 16 
UK 16 13 4 to 16 
Source: OECD (2006) Education at a Glance, Table C1.2 
 
 
Table 2.  Entry rates into tertiary education, 2004 
Country Tertiary type A (mainly University) % 
Tertiary type B 
(mainly technical/vocational) % 
Belgium 34 35 
Germany 37 16 
Greece 33 26 
Ireland 44 17 
Italy 55 1 
Netherlands 56 m 
UK 52 28 
Source: OECD (2006) Education at a Glance, Table C1.2 
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Table 3.  National income data sets used in the analysis 
Country Dataset Reference year 
Belgium (BE) European Union - Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003 
Germany (D) German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 2001 
Greece (GR) Household Budget Survey 2004 
Ireland (IR) Living in Ireland Survey 2000 
Italy (IT) European Union - Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003 
Netherlands (N) Socio-Economic Panel Survey 2001 
United Kingdom (UK) Family Resources Survey 2003 
 
Table 4.  Public spending per student in three educational levels (in current euros) 
Country 
Level of education 
Primary Secondary Tertiary  (with R&D) 
Tertiary 
(without 
R&D) 
Belgium 2003 4662 5814 8440 5809 
Germany 2001 3131 4857 8613 5410 
Greece 2004 2541 2984 3634 2772 
Ireland 2000 3291 4407 6060 4687 
Italy 2003 5310 5723 5055 3264 
Netherlands 2001 4250 5095 8174 5069 
UK 2003 2804 3495 4757 3660 
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Table 5. Re-ranking of countries after the inclusion of educational transfers in the 
concept of resources 
 
Country 
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1.5) 
Before After Rank Before After Rank Before After Rank 
Belgium 0.266 0.247 2/2 0.060 0.052 2/2 0.241 0.210 3/3 
Germany 0.295 0.275 3/4 0.076 0.067 4/4 0.228 0.200 2/2 
Greece 0.326 0.305 7/7 0.087 0.076 5/5 0.243 0.215 4/4 
Ireland 0.302 0.273 4/3 0.074 0.062 3/3 0.247 0.219 5/5 
Italy 0.325 0.296 5/5 0.091 0.076 7/6 0.272 0.223 6/6 
Netherlands 0.246 0.219 1/1 0.050 0.040 1/1 0.155 0.124 1/1 
UK 0.325 0.299 6/6 0.089 0.077 6/7 0.281 0.245 7/7 
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Graph 1. Expenditure on educational institutions by level of 
education (% of GDP, 2003)
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Source: OECD (2006, p. 206) 
 
 
Graph 2.  Expenditure on educational institutions by service 
category (% of GDP, 2003)
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A:  Core educational services (primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education) 
B:  Ancillary services (transport, meals, housing provided by institutions - primary, secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary education) 
C:  Private payments on instructional services/goods outside educational institutions (primary, secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary education) 
D:  Core educational services (tertiary education) 
E:  Ancillary services (transport, meals, housing provided by institutions - tertiary education) 
F:  Research and Development at tertiary education institutions 
G:  Private payments on instructional services/goods outside educational institutions (tertiary education) 
Source: OECD (2006, p. 252) 
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Graph 3. Distribution of beneficiaries per quintile
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Graph 4.  Distribution of beneficiaries per quintile (All) 
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Graph 5.  Relative ratio of potential beneficiaries
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Graph 6. Relative mean transfer per capita
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Graph 7.  Relative mean transfer per capita (All) 
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Graph 8.  Proportional increase in disposable income per quintile
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Graph 9.  Changes in quintile income shares  
(disposable income + public transfers) 
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Graph 10.  Changes in inequality due to public education transfers by level of education
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Graph 11.  Changes in inequality due to public education transfers (all levels) 
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Graph 12.  Changes in poverty due to public education transfers by level of education
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Graph 13.  Changes in poverty due to public education transfers (all levels) 
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Year Number Title/Author(s) 
ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2007 206 The Earnings of Immigrants in Ireland: Results 
from the 2005 EU Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions 
Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCarthy 
   
 205 Convergence of Consumption Patterns During 
Macroeconomic Transition: A Model of Demand in 
Ireland and the OECD 
Sean Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 204 The Adoption of ICT: Firm-Level Evidence from 
Irish Manufacturing Industries 
Stefanie Haller and Iulia Traistaru-Siedschlag 
   
 203 EU Enlargement and Migration: Assessing the 
Macroeconomic Impacts 
Ray Barrell, John Fitz Gerald and Rebecca Riley 
   
 202 The Dynamics of Economic Vulnerability: A 
Comparative European Analysis 
Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 201 Validating the European Socio-economic 
Classification: Cross-Sectional and Dynamic 
Analysis of Income Poverty and Lifestyle 
Deprivation 
Dorothy Watson, Christopher T. Whelan and 
Bertrand Maître 
   
 200 The ‘Europeanisation’ of Reference Groups:  
A Reconsideration Using EU-SILC 
Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
 
 199 Are Ireland’s Immigrants Integrating into its 
Labour Market? 
Alan Barrett and David Duffy 
 
 198 “Man Enough To Do It”? Girls and Non-Traditional 
Subjects in Lower Secondary Education 
Emer Smyth and Merike Darmody 
   
 197 Analysing the Effects of Tax-benefit Reforms on 
Income Distribution: A Decomposition Approach 
Olivier Bargain and Tim Callan 
 
 196 Heterogeneous Exporter Behaviour: Exploring the 
Evidence for Sunk-Costs and Hysteresis 
Frances Ruane 
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 195 The Regional Dimension of Taxes and Public 
Expenditure in Ireland 
Edgar Morgenroth 
   
   
 194 Do Consultation Charges Deter General Practitioner 
Use Among Older People? A Natural Experiment 
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee and Ann O’Hanlon 
   
 193 An Analysis of the Impact of Age and Proximity of 
Death on Health Care Costs in Ireland 
Richard Layte 
 
 192 Measuring Hospital Case Mix: Evaluation of 
Alternative Approaches for the Irish Hospital 
System 
Chris Aisbett, Miriam Wiley, Brian McCarthy, Aisling 
Mulligan 
 
 191 The Impact of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement 
on International Travel and Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions 
Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
 
 190 Comparing the Travel Cost Method and the 
Contingent Valuation Method – An Application of 
Convergent Validity Theory to the Recreational 
Value of Irish Forests 
Karen Mayor, Sue Scott, Richard S.J. Tol 
 
 189 The Impact of Flexible Working Arrangements on 
Work-Life Conflict and Work Pressure in Ireland 
Helen Russell, Philip J. O’Connell and Frances 
McGinnity 
 
 188 The Housing Tenure of Immigrants in Ireland:  
Some Preliminary Analysis 
David Duffy 
 
 187 The Impact of the UK Aviation Tax on Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and Visitor Numbers 
Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
 
 
 
186 
 
Irish Sustainable Development Model (ISus) 
Literature Review, Data Availability and Model 
Design 
Joe O’Doherty, Karen Mayor, Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 
